INTRODUCTION
The usefulness of neuroscience in determining the blameworthiness of a particular criminal defendant is highly contested.
1 On one side are those who argue that neuroscience is virtually irrelevant in criminal court or useful only as corroborating evidence of legally relevant impairment proven through other means. 2 On the other types of neuroscience evidence can be very useful in criminal adjudication, especially at sentencing. The article begins in Part I, like many articles in this vein do, by describing the criminal law doctrines that are most likely to trigger use of neuroscience. The description of this familiar territory is brief, meant only to emphasize that, at present, these doctrines are narrowly defined. At trial, they tend to minimize the relevance of, and sometimes preclude, neuroscience evidence. At sentencing, the scope of inquiry is broader and thus neuroscience is more likely to be useful. At the same time, however, if the risk of reoffending is a legitimate sentencing consideration, as is the case in many jurisdictions, such evidence is also often relevant to the prosecution's case.
Part II identifies five types of neuroscience evidence and describes how they relate to the law defining criminal liability and criminal punishment described in Part I. The five types, in roughly ascending order of usefulness, are as follows: (1) Evidence of abnormality: Evidence showing that the defendant has neurological impairment (eg brain imaging showing that the defendant has frontal lobe disorder, or FLD); (2) Cause-of-an-effect evidence: Evidence showing that the defendant's neurological impairment is common in criminals or others who behave in an antisocial manner (eg research showing that many criminals have FLD); (3) Effect-of-a-cause evidence: Evidence tending to show that the defendant's neurological impairment predisposed him or her to commit the crime (eg research showing that people with FLD are more likely to commit crime than those without FLD); (4) Individualized neuropsychological findings compared against known performance baselines: Psychoneurological testing results showing that the defendant has behavioral impairments that are legally relevant (eg testing showing that the defendant, say one with FLD, is highly impulsive or unable to conceptualize); and (5) Individualized neuropsychological findings compared against known performance baselines: Evidence showing that the defendant's impairments are similar to impairments the law has recognized as exculpatory or mitigating (eg evidence that the defendant's FLD is similar in legally relevant respects to the brain of a 14 year old).
The admissibility of neuroscience evidence should depend on which of these five categories is at issue. All five types of evidence may have what has been called 'rhetorical relevance', that is, the potential for swaying a judge or jury in the defendant's (or prosecution's) favor. 5 But a close analysis of each type of evidence makes clear that genuine relevance establishes a narrower threshold. More specifically, the first two types of neuroscience evidence should often be considered immaterial at trial; whether they should be admissible at sentencing depends on the law of the jurisdiction. The other three types of neuroscience evidence are more likely to be relevant at both trial and sentencing, with the final category of evidence probably being the most persuasive. But these latter types of evidence are also much more difficult to produce than the first two.
As the foregoing summary suggests, this article focuses entirely on what evidence scholars call relevance or materiality; it avoids complications that arise when courts also consider the validity of the science presented. Thus, this article will assume the accuracy of expert testimony to the effect that a defendant has, for example, FLD, that research indicates a certain proportion of prisoners have FLD, or that a defendant has particular types of volitional impairment. This assumption is a big one, since some types of testimony about neuroscience are of questionable scientific pedigree. 6 But, over time, many of these flaws in producing neuroscience evidence could well be overcome. Further, this assumption allows attention to be focused on the more important issue, at least from the legal perspective, of when neuroscience evidence is relevant to criminal liability and punishment.
CRIMINAL L AW DOCTRINE 7
Suppose the following: John Doe, a 55-year-old farmer, is charged with murder. 8 There is no doubt Doe killed the person the prosecution alleges he killed; in fact Doe admits he shot the victim as she crossed one of his fields. Doe also says that at the time of the killing he was angry at the victim, who he believed had routinely trespassed on his property and scoffed at him when Doe protested. But Doe admits he did not act in self-defense. Although Doe has no criminal record, he and his family tell defense counsel that he has a history of 'blowing up' at people. In the hopes of finding something that will mitigate her client's culpability, the lawyer goes to a neurologist, who scans the client's brain and finds evidence of what the expert calls 'frontal lobe disorder'.
The lawyer is excited by these results. But should she be? Does or should the criminal law consider this type of neuroscience evidence useful in deciding whether to convict or how much to punish an individual? If so, how can the lawyer shape the neuroscience evidence to make the best case possible at trial or sentencing? Should the attorney worry about the possibility that this evidence might be more useful to the prosecution?
Consider first the use of neuroscience to mitigate or nullify criminal responsibility at trial. At this stage of the process, neuroscience is most likely to be relevant to four defensive arguments: a claim that the defendant's act was 'involuntary', a claim that the defendant lacked the mens rea (or mental state) for the offense, and a claim that the defendant was insane, due either to cognitive or volitional impairment. All of these doctrines have a limited scope.
The involuntary act argument is seldom applicable in a criminal case. It requires proof of a lack of conscious control over the body, as might occur with an epileptic seizure or sleepwalking. and behavior still exists. Doe's admission that he consciously took aim and shot the victim precludes this defense in his case.
The second possible legal defense focuses on whether the defendant had the mens rea for the crime. For instance, first-degree murder requires proof of premeditation, while second-degree murder requires intent to kill, and manslaughter is usually associated with an intentional killing in the heat of passion or a non-intentional but reckless killing. 10 Most people, even those with flagrant psychosis (think of Andrea Yates, the woman who drowned her five children 11 ), have the intent to engage in the conduct associated with the crime and to cause its result. Those who do not usually are at least reckless with respect to harm they cause, which often means they are guilty of some offense, albeit perhaps not as serious as one that requires intent.
12 Doe might have a partial mens rea defense. Given his admission that he intended to harm the victim, he cannot escape some liability. But he might be able to argue that his impairment meant he lacked the capacity to premeditate the killing, and thus at most is guilty of second-degree murder. He might even be able to argue that he was experiencing what the Model Penal Code calls 'extreme mental or emotional disturbance' (EMED) at the time of the crime, which if proven could, in some jurisdictions, allow him to end up with a manslaughter rather than murder conviction. 13 To succeed with this defense, however, he would have to show his anger is a 'reasonable' response to the victim's actions.
14 Furthermore, this argument is available only when the charge is homicide; EMED mitigation is not available in non-homicide cases.
The third and fourth possible defenses both have to do with insanity. The first question under any insanity test is whether the defendant had a mental disease or defect at the time of the crime. 15 Although the typical mental disorder associated with insanity is psychosis, 16 this predicate has generally been given broad scope, with a typical definition based on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals formulation stating that 'a mental disease or defect includes any abnormal condition of the mind which substantially 10 See id at 809 (first-degree murder), 816 (second-degree murder), 819 (manslaughter 582 r Neuroscience nuance affects mental or emotional processes and substantially impairs behavior controls'.
17
The evidence of FLD in Doe's case might well get the defense past that hurdle. However, proving the mental defect predicate is not enough. The second question in an insanity case addresses the kind of impairment the mental defect caused. One formulation of this issue focuses on cognitive impairment, usually described as a substantial inability to know or appreciate the wrongfulness of the criminal act, and a second type of insanity test looks at volitional impairment, usually described as an irresistible impulse or a significantly impaired ability to conform behavior to the requirements of the law.
18 Because the impairment under either prong must be serious, even people with psychosis are often convicted under these defenses.
19 Doe may have thought the victim was in the wrong, but he also likely appreciated that he should not have killed her. 20 At best, then, he might have a volitional insanity defense. But that defense usually requires proof of a very strong compulsion, 21 and in any event less than a third of the states recognize it.
22
This brief list exhausts the defenses available to most criminal defendants who assert they have a neurological impairment that mitigates their criminal liability. It should be apparent that in most cases neuroscience is not likely to be useful in proving these defenses, even if the court allows it to be introduced. In some cases where there is already strong evidence of automatic behavior, lack of intent, or severe cognitive or volitional impairment, such evidence might provide helpful corroboration of a defense. But in the typical criminal case, like Doe's, the defendant acts voluntarily, with intent, and with an understanding of the distinctions society makes between right and wrong. That leaves as the only viable defense in the typical neuroscience case either an EMED claim or an insanity claim based on volitional impairment. But, again, very few states recognize either defense.
Once a person has been convicted and sentencing is the issue, the law's strictures on evidence are more relaxed, 23 but not necessarily significantly. For instance, under the federal sentencing guidelines applicable in non-capital cases, a 'downward departure' based on mitigating mental condition is generally permissible only if the condition is 'present to an unusual degree' that 'distinguish [ offense'. 25 Further the guidelines provide that a downward departure should generally not be granted at all if, as is possible in Doe's case, the offense (or the defendant's criminal history) indicates 'a need to incarcerate the defendant to protect the public'.
26 Some states are more open to mitigating evidence at sentencing, but others follow the federal government's lead. 27 The situation is different at capital sentencing. There, the Supreme Court has held that, given the heightened concern about reliability when the death penalty is a possibility, virtually any evidence about the offender's character should be admitted. 28 That stance may explain why the available data indicate that neuroscience evidence is presented as often in death penalty cases as in all other types of cases combined. 29 At the same time, in many states prosecutors are allowed to argue in support of the death penalty that the defendant is dangerous, 30 which a capital sentencing jury might well conclude is the case with an offender whose ability to control conduct is impaired. This so-called double-edged sword problem (which as indicated above, also afflicts noncapital sentencing) could lead defense attorneys to hesitate about introducing neuroscience evidence even when it appears to be strongly mitigating. 31 Thus, at both trial and sentencing, several obstacles to the presentation of neuroscience evidence exist, even assuming the science itself is impeccable. That does not mean that neuroscience is usually excluded. Even when they doubt its relevance, judges may decide to allow introduction of evidence to avoid a possible appellate issue. Nonetheless, the narrowness of the criminal law's doctrines probably affects outcomes. The available data (which, admittedly, are spotty) indicate that neuroscience rarely has an impact outside of capital cases, and even there the impact appears to be minimal. 32 25 Id., § 5K2.13 (Diminished Capacity). 26 Understanding why requires a closer look at the types of neuroscience evidence that might exist and how they relate to the substantive criminal law.
FIVE T YPES OF NEUROSCIENCE EVIDENCE 33
Under current law, neuroscience will probably not be useful at criminal trials or noncapital sentencing unless it can be associated with very significant cognitive or volitional impairment, and even at capital sentencing its usefulness may be a mixed bag. Yet such evidence undoubtedly will still be proffered, especially by defense attorneys. Courts, lawyers, and experts considering whether to admit, present, or testify about neurological findings should consider carefully the specific types of neuroscience evidence at issue, because not all of it is of equal value. There are at least five such categories, discussed here in ascending order of usefulness.
Evidence of Abnormality
The simplest, and perhaps the most common, type of neuroscience evidence proffered at trial or sentencing purports to show that the defendant's brain is different from a 'healthy' or 'normal' brain. For instance, as in Doe's case, the defendant might be diagnosed with frontal lobe disorder or a traumatic brain injury (TBI) based on the results of a brain scan obtained through structural magnetic resonance imaging (sMRI).
34
More specifically, the results might show, for example, both a 'reduced volume' in the frontal lobe (the area of the brain associated with executive functions such as planning, decision making, and regulation of impulses) and a 'reduced volume' in the left side of the limbic system (associated with regulation of emotions, in particular mediation of perception and action), the combination of which suggests greater impul-29, at 507-8 (finding a success rate of 25% for claims that counsel was ineffective due to a failure to make neuroscience-related arguments; although the author points out that this is a relatively high success rate for IAC claims, these claims typically ask only for resentencing, not dismissal, so even in the 'successful' cases the ultimate impact of neuroscience evidence is unclear). Similar findings come from Farahany, supra note 29, who found that between 20% and 30% of defendants who presented neuroscience evidence 'enjoyed some success on appeal', most on ineffective assistance grounds, Id. at 507. Farahany also states that 'while neurobiological evidence may bolster a finding of mental illness or impairment, the legal standard for insanity may still remain an insurmountable hurdle for most defendants', Id. at 500, and that with respect to intent, 'judges and juries tend to credit the circumstantial evidence (finding that, in 'most cases' in which appellants raised neuroscience claims, convictions were affirmed, and that neuroscience substantially contributed to success at sentencing in about 10% of the cases). 33 The term 'neuroscience', as used in this article, is meant to apply broadly to evidence based on brain scans, including fMRI, EEG, CT, and PET scans, as well as evidence that links brain circuitry or functioning to certain types of behavior. While there may be more 'neuro' than 'science' in the instances reported here, this usage is consistent with how courts, and scholars who have looked at the courts' decisions, refer to the subject. sivity. 35 Or a positron emission tomography (PET) or functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 36 might show that the individual has 'low-resting metabolism in the amygdala and high-resting metabolism in cortical regions', suggesting that the person is 'vulnerable to loss of control when challenged because the amygdala, which issues the fight-or-flight signal, will be activated while the cortex, or "thinking brain," becomes hypoactivated'. 37 Ideally, this evidence would be accompanied by a behavioral history of episodic temper tantrums or similar evidence of dyscontrol, as manifested in Doe's case.
On its face, this type of evidence may seem very relevant to criminal liability. But in fact it is only weakly so. The problem with such evidence is that it fails to make the causative link between the neurological impairment and the crime. The fact that a person's brain structure or functioning is abnormal does not mean that the abnormality contributed significantly or at all to a specific act such as a criminal offense. For one thing, a brain scan after a crime may well misrepresent what the brain was like at the time of the crime. 38 More importantly, determining whether a given neural defect, even if stable, contributed to a particular crime will rarely be possible, 39 at least in the absence of group or individual data focused on that issue (the third and fourth categories of evidence described below). 40 Many people who have a 'reduced volume in the frontal lobe' or 'low-resting metabolism in the amygdala', just like many people who are intellectually disabled or have TBI, never commit crime or come close to doing so, even when they manifest irrational or impulsive behavior on a routine basis. 41 In some cases, the circumstantial behavioral evidence may be sufficient to overcome this problem. For instance, in one famous case, a Virginia schoolteacher who at age 37 35 suddenly developed an interest in child pornography and eventually sexually propositioned his stepdaughter (as well as the female staff of the treatment program to which he was sentenced!) was found to have a brain tumor; after surgery, his impulsive sexualized conduct abated. When, about a year later, he began engaging in highly sexualized behavior again, doctors found that the tumor had regrown; complete removal of the tumor ended the antisocial behavior. 42 Somewhat less persuasive, but similarly dramatic, was the neurological evidence in the case of Charles Whitman, the sniper who killed several people at the University of Texas and upon autopsy was found to have a brain tumor encroaching on his amygdala. 43 But cases like these are very unusual; few defendants can present the seemingly straightforward connection between neurology and behavior that these cases provide.
In short, evidence of abnormality, on its own, is rarely material at trial to prove impairment at the time of the offense or as proof of what may have caused any impairment that the defendant asserts. In cases similar to the Virginia schoolteacher's and Whitman's, it may be relevant to an EMED argument in a homicide trial or to a volitional insanity defense in those states that recognize that doctrine. But the typical evidence of neurological abnormality provides an insufficient basis for making the necessary link to the crime. For that reason, it may not even be relevant at sentencing, at least outside the death penalty setting. 44 Indeed, as indicated earlier, in federal court such evidence is explicitly irrelevant at ordinary sentencing proceedings when it is also suggestive of high risk (presumably not an issue in the schoolteacher's case once the tumor was removed, but arguably a serious one if the evidence shows, as in the initial example above, that the person is 'vulnerable to loss of control when challenged').
Cause of an Effect Research
Perhaps, however, if evidence of a defendant's abnormality can be supplemented with research showing a heightened occurrence of antisocial or criminal behavior among similarly impaired individuals, the defense might fare better. Defense attorneys could proffer two types of studies along these lines. The first type, discussed here, addresses what statisticians call the cause (in our case, brain abnormality) of an effect (in our case, violence). 45 An early example of cause-of-an-effect research in the neurology domain, replicated many times since, is a study conducted by Bryant and his colleagues. 46 Bryant looked at 110 inmates, 55 of whom committed violent crime and 55 of whom committed non-violent crime. 47 He found that 73% of the prisoners convicted of violent crime had FLD, while only 28% of those who committed non-violent crime had FLD. 48 Put another way, the Bryant study suggests that, among those apprehended for committing a violent crime, there is a 73% chance that the perpetrator has frontal lobe damage (FLD). Other researchers have obtained similar results. 49 This type of evidence sounds highly exculpatory, at least in a jurisdiction with a volitional impairment defense or where premeditation is an issue. But, looked at closely, this kind of research tells us only that a high proportion of violent people have FLD. It does not indicate the probability that people who have FLD will be violent, which is the central question the law wants answered. Unfortunately, when defense attorneys present nomothetic (group-based) research, it is most likely to be this type of causeof-an effect data. In related contexts, courts have rightly held that such evidence is not germane to whether defendants engaged in the kind of uncontrollable, unintentional, or highly impulsive conduct that is the focus of exculpatory doctrines. 50 Because this kind of research says virtually nothing about how the asserted abnormality contributed to crime, it is no more useful than evidence of abnormality by itself.
Effect of a Cause Research
Another type of study, which compares the prevalence of criminal behavior among those with neurological impairment to those who do not have such impairment, comes closer to answering the causation question, because rather than addressing the cause of an effect, it addresses the effect (eg violence) of a cause (eg FLD). For instance, some research indicates that, all else being equal, the prevalence rate for violence among people with FLD is about 10% higher than for those who are not lobe damaged, data suggesting that FLD predisposes people to commit crime. 51 Studies also indicate that maltreated children, who tend to have smaller cortical volume, exhibit higher rates of adult maladaptive conduct than controls. 52 In contrast to mere evidence of abnormality, this type of evidence is useful in addressing causation, because it suggests that, in a certain percentage of cases, but for the brain dysfunction the crime would not have occurred. But this type of data must be put in context. Without knowing the base rate for violence by people who do not have the relevant neurological abnormality, crime prevalence information is of little help to legal factfinders. If it turns out, for instance, that only about 2% of the general population commits violent crime (a probable overestimate), 53 the statistics described above indicating a higher rate of violence among those with FLD merely establish that 2.2% of people with FLD commit violent crime, which does not suggest a high level of impulsivity (or of cognitive impairment). More to the point, those statistics are unlikely to be influential with a judge or jury.
Some studies point to much higher prevalence rates associated with genetic traits. Perhaps most famous in this regard is a neurogenetic study carried out by Avshalom Caspi and his colleagues examining 442 men in New Zealand. Caspi found that, by age 26, roughly 85% of the men within this group who had been abused as children and had low serotonin levels (low MAOA activity alleles) committed rape, robbery, or assault, four times the average of the overall group. 54 This evidence suggests that just two characteristics-one environmental and one genetic-strongly predispose people to commit serious crime.
The main argument that even this evidence should not be exculpatory or have significant mitigating effect has been most forcefully put by Stephen Morse:
Whether a predisposing factor is produced by a mental disorder or by some other 'normal' or 'abnormal' cause makes no difference to whether the agent is responsible. A cause is just a cause, and causation per se is not an excuse, whether the causation is 'normal' or 'abnormal.' If causation were an excuse, no one would be responsible for any conduct, because all behavior is caused by multiple variables not within the agent's control. 55 In this view, Caspi's study would be immaterial at trial, and perhaps of low value to the defense at sentencing as well, even assuming that dangerousness is not an offsetting consideration.
In essence, Morse's stance is that, when gauging criminal responsibility, all causes are the same. As a doctrinal matter, however, that is not correct. The insanity defense gives exculpatory effect to a particular cause: 'mental disease or defect'. The EMED formulation gives mitigating effect to 'unusual ... mental disturbance' and the federal sentencing guidelines allow downward departures for 'mental conditions'. While perhaps based more on folk psychology and intuition than pristine philosophical tenets, 56 legal doctrine has long been based on a 'medical model', 57 differentiating between people who act precipitously because of 'mental disorder' and people who do so because they are drunk, have a strong libido, had a bad day at work, or picked on the victim because the victim reminded them of an abusive father. Studies like Caspi's provide evidence of the distinctive cause the law seeks with its exculpatory and mitigating doctrines. Of course, such proof does not end the matter; all of the exculpatory and mitigating legal doctrines also have a behavioral component. Even if the defense presents strong evidence that the crime is caused by neurological abnormality, the prosecutor will often be able to point to evidence of planning, which undercuts an EMED or volitional insanity defense. The prosecutor might also emphasize that even in the Caspi cohort 15% of those studied did not commit crime, suggesting control is possible. At sentencing, the prosecutor confronted with the Caspi study might add that the same two traits that mitigate also aggravate, given their link to violent behavior.
Finally, the prosecutor can undermine effect-of-cause studies by pointing to difficulties in generalizing from a nomothetic study to the case at hand. 58 For instance, if prevalence research about FLD defines FLD narrowly, to require evidence of a serious defect, but the FLD of someone like Doe is minimal, it is only tangential to the defendant's case. Similarly, if most of the crimes committed by the Caspi cohort were assaults, that study may not be considered particularly germane in a murder trial.
Individualized Neuropsychological Findings Compared Against Known
Performance Baselines A fourth type of expert testimony-one that might be combined with the third type in an effort to show the criminogenic effects of neural abnormality-would begin not with neurological findings, but with behavioral findings produced by neuropsychological testing. For instance, a neuroscientist or neuropsychologist evaluating someone like Doe might administer standardized tests that measure various domains of self-control, such as the Go/NoGo, Stop-Signal, and Card Sorting tasks, and then compare the defendant's results to baseline results for the general population. 59 In this way, the expert might be able to say something meaningful about a particular defendant's capacity to control conduct, and perhaps as well the defendant's ability to plan, form intent, and be cognizant of risks, issues relevant to mens rea inquiries. This type of information differs from simple evidence about abnormality and its usual effects (the first two types of evidence discussed) because it provides insight into the particular defendant's functioning, rather than the type of functioning that might accompany a particular brain anomaly and is not specific to the individual.
Several obstacles confront this approach, however. One concern that need not give us pause is the fact that, because these performance tasks involve asking the subject to choose to respond to stimuli, malingering is possible. 60 Fortunately, methods can be devised to overcome this problem. 61 In any event, as noted earlier, this article assumes that testing results validly show what they purport to show. of a defendant's brain with the average analogous results for juveniles or people with intellectual disability, the testimony could be considered highly relevant, at least at sentencing.
This use of neuroscience has been called 'scientific stare decisis'-the notion that scientifically similar groups ought to be treated the same for legal purposes. 69 If a 30-year-old's brain looks like or functions the same way as a juvenile's brain in relevant respects, the law ought to evaluate that adult's culpability in the same way it does a juvenile's. The Supreme Court has obliquely recognized this idea in Sears v Upton, 70 where it reversed a death sentence of a person who performed at or below the bottom first percentile in several measures of cognitive functioning and reasoning because of FLD. The Court explained that, even though the defendant did not necessarily suffer these impairments before the age of 18 (which is required under the exemption established in Atkins), he should nonetheless be exempted from the death penalty because 'regardless of the cause of his brain damage [,] he was among the most impaired individuals in the population'. 71 The primary obstacle here is the scientific and legal challenge of identifying the neurological characteristics that should be used to make these comparisons. While the measures of cognitive functioning that impressed the Court in Sears might allow juxtaposing people whose impairments developed at different points of their lives, neurological data may not be similarly commensurate. In particular, reliably comparing the brain of an adult with that of a juvenile in legally relevant domains may be very difficult, given developmental differences.
However, there is some hope in this regard. In a series of preliminary studies, Kiehl and his colleagues developed a measure of 'brain age' using 19 partitions of gray matter, the volume and density of which change systematically across individuals in a manner consistent with aging processes. 72 After obtaining brain age MRI data from a sample of 1300 individuals, ranging in chronological age from 12 to 65, the researchers studied an independent sample for which they had recidivism data. They found that 'the brain-age measures outperformed chronological age in calculating how likely an individual was to be reincarcerated'. 73 In other words, criminality was more closely linked to the maturity of the brain than to the age of the person.
While this research focused on risk rather than culpability, Kiehl's group also found that the same nine brain areas-found in the anterior temporal lobes, the amygdala, and the orbital frontal cortex-were 'reasonable targets for assessing the relationship between antisocial behavior and neural function'. 74 This finding supports the proposition that if a particular adult's neural function can be shown to be similar to that of the average juvenile, mitigation at sentencing may be the appropriate response. Once again, however, because the same evidence may also indicate higher recidivism risk, advocates will need to think carefully about how to frame such neurological evidence.
CONCLUSION
This brief survey of the extent to which neuroscience evidence might be relevant under current criminal law doctrine suggests that courts and juries could properly be dismissive of much of it simply on materiality grounds, before even beginning to evaluate its validity. In particular, simple evidence of neuroabnormalities and research about the cause of effects is of minimal relevance. At the same time, courts should give careful consideration to and welcome good prevalence research addressing the criminogenic effects of neurological aberration like the defendant's, individualized neuropsychological tests results about legally relevant impairments that are gauged on relevant reference groups, and comparisons of the defendant's brain scans with scans of populations, like juveniles, that are legally entitled to mitigation. Unfortunately, the latter three types of evidence are much more difficult to produce than the first two.
Of course, another way to increase the relevance of neuroscience is to modify legal doctrine. An incremental change, suggested by Deborah Denno, is to recognize an intermediate defense between involuntariness and full culpability that permits more lenient treatment when a person acts intentionally but with impaired consciousness. 75 A similar result might be achieved by construing either or both prongs of the insanity defense more broadly, 76 and by extending the EMED defense to all crimes. The double-edged sword dilemma that arises when neuroscience evidence meant to be mitigating can simultaneously be characterized as indicative of risk might also be addressed. The claim has been made that prosecutors seldom exploit evidence of neurological impairment, even when it suggests that the defendant represents a high risk of reoffending. 77 But, anecdotally, defense attorneys involved in capital sentencing proceedings are clearly concerned about that possibility, 78 and prosecutors and courts have been known to use analogous mitigation evidence as a sword. 79 One response
